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Fuzzy Judgment in Bargaining Games: Diverse Patterns of Price 
Determination and Transaction in Buyer-Seller Exchange.  
 
Ewa Roszkowska and Tom R. Burns. 
 
This paper draws on fuzzy judgment theory in the description and analysis of buyer-seller 
bargaining conditions and price determination processes, taking into account players’ 
economic as well as non-economic values. Given the players’ initial value (or utility) 
structures vis-à-vis one another, thirteen (13) distinct situations in their negotiation space 
can be identified and described formally (geometrically and algebraically), each situation 
defining a particular negotiation space and a settlement price range. Particular value 
structures derive from the players’ social relationship and operate in two ways on the 
bargaining process: First, they orient players to, or focus them on, particular zone(s) of 
the settlement interval, namely those that most closely correspond to or fits the core 
value(s) of their social relationship. Second, they operate in adapting or transforming the 
players’ goals or aspiration levels in the bargaining game in a manner consistent with 
their relationship. 





In the  general theory of games (GGT) (Burns and Gomolinska, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 
Burns et al, 2001; Gomolinska 1999), games are conceptualized in a uniform and general 
way in terms of the concepts of rule
3 and rule complexes.
4 A well-specified game at time 
t is a particular interaction situation where there are general rules for the players and they 
have well-defined roles (rule complexes) with respect to one another (however, not all 
games are necessarily well-defined with, for instance, clearly specified and consistent 
roles and role relationship(s)). A social role is a particular rule complex, serving as the 
basis of an incumbent's judgments and actions in relation to other players in their roles in 
the defined game
5.  
  Role and role relationships provide frames of appropriate rules including values 
and norms; these are particular ways in which actions are classified, judged, and given 
“internal” interpretations and meanings (Burns and Flam, 1987). “Non-cooperation”  in, 
                                                            
3 Rules are a type of knowledge (Burns and Flam, 1987; Burns, 1990). An abstract, formal conception of a 
rule may be expressed as follows (Burns and Gomolinska, 1998; Gomolinska, 2002): A rule r in a given 
language is a triple r=(X, Y, α) where X and Y are finite sets of formulas of the language called  the set of 
premises or conditions  and the set of justifications (default provisions or exception conditions), 
respectively, and where α is a formula called the  conclusion of rule r. The latter either provides 
information, evaluation, or a directive or requirement for action (in this case of a directive, the actor is 
supposed to implement or perform it). All elements of X   should hold and all elements of Y may hold (in 
the latter case, an actor presumes that justifications  hold on the basis of lack of information to the contrary. 
When they do not hold, then an “exception” obtains, that is the rule cannot be  applied). If the premises 
obtain and the justifications are not known to not apply, then the actor applies r and α is concluded. If the 
set of justifications is non-empty, then the rule is in fact a sort of default rule (Reiter’s (1980) default logic). 
If the set of premises and justifications are both empty, then the rule is  axiomatic -- such rules may 
represent “facts” and unconditional directives. Axiomatic rules can be viewed as equivalent to their 
conclusions. Since all formulas can be rewritten in the form of axiomatic rules, the basic (but not atomic!) 
objects  of our conceptual space are just rules. One can distinguish several types of rules, e.g., declarative, 
prescriptive, proscriptive, evaluative, decision rules,  etc.   
4 The motivation behind the development of the concept of rule complex has been to consider repertoires of 
rules in all their complexity with complex interdependencies among the rules and, hence, to treat them not 
merely as sets of rules but as entities containing members relating to the relationships among members. The 
organization of rules in rule complexes provides us with a powerful tool to investigate and describe various 
sorts of rules with respect to their functions such as values, norms, judgment rules, prescriptive rules, and 
meta-rules as well as more complex objects consisting of rules such as roles, routines, algorithms, action 
modalities, models of reality as well as social relationships and games (see later). Informally speaking, a 
rule complex is a set consisting of rules and/or other rule complexes (see Gomolinska, 2002). More 
formally, a rule complex is a set obtained from rules according to the following formation rules: (1) Any  
set of rules is a rule complex; (2) If C  is a family of rule complexes, then the union over the family C, C,  
is a rule complex; (3)  the power set Ρ(C) of a rule complex C is a rule complex;  (4) If C ⊆ D and D is a 
rule complex, then C is a rule complex.  In words, the class of rule complexes contains all  sets of rules, is 
closed under the  union and the power set, and preserves inclusion. Notice that for any rule complex C and 
a set X, C− X is a rule complex. Similarly, for any non-empty family of rule complexes C, the intersection 
of the family C, C is a rule complex. 
5 The notion of a situation is a primitive. S denotes situations with subscripts, if needed. We use the lower 
case t, possibly with subscripts, to denote points of time or context (or other reference). Thus, St denotes a 
situation at time or context t. Given a concrete situation S at t, a general game structure is represented as a 
particular rule complex G(t). This complex includes roles as rule subcomplexes along with norms and other 
rules. 
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for instance, a prisoners' dilemma (PD for short) situation is not merely “defection” in the 
case that the players are friends or relatives in a solidary relationship, but viewed rather 
as a form of  “disloyalty” or “betrayal” and subject to harsh social judgment and sanction 
(but the quality and extent of such sanctions may not be fully known beforehand or 
recognized ex post by those subject to them). In the case of enemies, “defection” in the 
PD game would be fully expected and considered  “natural” -- neither shameful nor 
contemptible, but right and proper damage to the other, and, hence, not a matter of   
“defection” at all. Such considerations enable one to systematically identify and analyze 
the symbolic and moral aspects of games associated with particular social relationships 
and normative contexts. 
  An player's role is specified in GGT  in terms of a few basic cognitive and 
normative components (formalized as mathematical objects in Burns and Gomolinska, 
1998, 2000a, 2000b; Burns et al 1998, 2001; Gomolinska 1999). Each role consists of at 
least the following: 
i) a  model describing the players' “situational view” and providing the perspective 
on, and basis for understanding of, the reality of the interaction when the game is 
played. It consists of a complex of rules representing players' beliefs about 
themselves, their environment, interaction conditions and constraints;  
ii)  a  complex of “values” consisting of the players' values, goals and commitments. 
In this complex there are rules assigning values to things and deeds, determining 
what is “good”, “bad”, ”acceptable”, “unacceptable”;  
iii)  a complex of “actions”  including acts, routines, programs, and strategies which 
can be used by the players in order to respond or to deal with problems and 
challenges in the context of the situation; in open games (Burns et al, 2001), the 
players construct and develop strategies as the game goes on, for instance, 
formulating proposals and counter-proposals.   
iv) a  “modality” complex defining a  player's action mode for generating or 
determining actions. Among the important types of modality are instrumental 
rationality (the usual rational choice mode), normative orientation, habitual and 
ritualistic modes of action,  and combinations of these.  
In a generalized game or interaction situation, the players evaluate and regulate their 
actions, paying attention to systems of norms and values, and their relationships to one 
another (as well as to other players). Each player makes judgments about what is best or 
appropriate to do, or to avoid doing in the particular circumstances.
6  
This paper describes and analyzes buyer-seller exchange on the basis of fuzzy 
judgment theory, which is one of the core components of GGT. The necessary analytical 
tools are presented in section 2 and applied to buyer-seller bargaining in section 3. The 
paper specifies and analyzes the diverse patterns of exchange and price determination, 
arising as a function of the type of bargaining situation and the character of the players’ 





                                                            
6 For a discussion of correspondences between these notions and some notions of classical game theory, see 
Burns et al (2001) and Burns and Roszkowska (2002).  5 
 
2. CONCEPTUALIZING FUZZY BARGAINING GAMES  
 
In open games, players are able to construct and elaborate strategies and outcomes in the 
course of their interaction, for instance in market exchange as a bargaining game (Burns 
et al, 2001). In such games there is a socially constructed “bargaining space” within 
which there are settlement possibilities varying as a function of the players’ particular 
roles and social relationships in that context. 
  Consider a buyer B  and a seller S bargaining about the price p of a good or 
service X (Burns et al, 2001; Burns and Roszkowska, 2002). Seller S has a minimum or 
reserve price pS(min)  and buyer B  has a maximum price pB(max) where presumably 
pS(min)<pB(max). We obtain the following spaces for a seller PS=[pS(min), ∞ + ), a buyer 
PB=[0, pB(max)],  and the negotiation space  for both, NS=PS∩PB . Each also has an 
operative goal, ambition level, or ideal conception  of a “good deal” or possibly a “fair 
deal” in the particular situation:  pS(ideal) and pB(ideal), where pS(ideal)∈PS  and 
pB(ideal)∈PB.  Determination of these values is based, in part, on what they believe or 
guess about one another's limits (namely the reserve price of the seller and the value of 
the buyer) or the determination can be based on past experience (or on some theory, 
which may or may not be accurate). Typically, these are adjusted as the bargaining 
process goes on (Burns et al, 1998). The ” anchoring points” of ideals and limits in 
players’ value complexes make up a fuzzy semantic space, which is basic to the judgment 
processes that go on in the bargaining. By “fuzzy” we are referring to the vagueness, lack 
of precision, or roughness of concepts, judgments, and beliefs of players; in addressing 
these phenomena, we employ fuzzy set methods (Zadeh, 1965, 1973, 1996; Burns and 
Roszkowska, 2002, Gomolinska, 2002; Nurmi, 1978, 1981, 2000). Based on their fuzzy 
judgments, the players propose prices and accept or reject one another’s the proposals. 
When one accepts the proposal of another, a deal is made. The proposal is the selling or 
final price. 
In bargaining games, for instance in market exchange, the socially constructed 
“negotiation space” NS  (with its settlement possibilities) varies as a function of the 
players’ particular needs or limits defined in PS and PB as well as the particular social 
relationship between them in the context of which the bargaining interactions take place. 
In previous papers (Burns et al, 2001; Burns and Roszkowska, 2002), we assumed that 
pS(min)<pB  (max) obtained between S’s reserve or minimum price pS(min) and B’s 
maximum price or value pB(max). Here we relax this restriction and consider all 
possibilities which can be generated in such games.  
 
GGT formulates models of the judgment process and, in particular, the judgment of 
similarity or dissimilarity and the ways in which players use approximate reasoning and 
deal with imprecise information in making decisions, interacting, and negotiating 
agreements. The conceptualization of fuzzy judgment entails a two process model: 
 (1) the judgment of similarity and dissimilarity (where threshold functions) are provided; 
 (2) the judgment of fit or degree of membership formulated as a fuzzy set M taking on 
      values between [0,1]. 
  6 
 
As we discuss more fully below, the judgment expression J(i,t) for player i at time or 
context t along with its thresholds is transformed into a fuzzy function M
7. Function M 
does two things.  First, it normalizes judgment with a minimum (=0) for sufficiently 
dissimilar and a maximum (=1) for sufficiently similar. Second, when one has less than 
perfect similarity (or dissimilarity), it distinguishes the degree of fit or membership, 
which may be based on fuzzy verbal distinctions such as “moderately fitting”, 
“borderline”, and “not fitting very well.” That is, it represents fuzzy judgments between 
the maximum and minimum with breakpoints or thresholds based on distinctions such as 
“moderately fitting” and “borderline”, or other semantic distinctions. Rather than 
judgment being a matter of yes or no, it may express a degree of, for instance, preference, 
consensus, compliance, rule matching or equilibrium.
8 
In a market bargaining game, the negotiators’ fuzzy judgment functions  
concerning price levels can be generated as follows. For seller  S, the fuzzy evaluative 
judgment function, J(S,t), at time or context t is given by the membership function MJ(S,t) 
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where x denotes  an offer (or option)  and c∈(0.5, 1). 
 
For player B, the fuzzy evaluative judgment function, J(B,t), at time or context t is 
given by its membership function MJ(B,t) which may be represented as follows: 
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where y denotes an  offer (or option)  and d∈(0.5, 1). 
 
                                                            
7 Definition: A fuzzy set A in a universe of discourse U = {u1, u2,..., un} will be represented by a set of pairs 
(MA(u),u)  ∀ u ∈ U, where MA: UÆ [0,1] is an actor's judgment of the fit or degree of membership 
degree of u in A:  from full membership (=1) to full non-membership (=0) through  all intermediate values.  
Consider that one of the objects in the universe U is a rule or standard r. We are interested in judgments 
about the degree of fit with, or membership degree of, some condition or action x with respect to a norm or 
value r that is, J(i,t)(x, r). In  the case that norms and values as well as actions and outcomes are completely 
crisp, we have the classical case.  
8 In general, GGT is able to make use of key social concepts which are imprecise and ambiguous: definition 
of the situation, the game or type of game, role, norm, value, particular types of action such as 
“cooperation'' and  “non-cooperation'', or “compliance'' and “non-compliance''. 
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MJ(S,t)(x) (res. MJ(B,t)(y))  is interpreted as  seller’s (res. buyer’s)  “degree of satisfaction” 
with price for a good X. It can vary from unsatisfactory (when the price is beyond the 
player’s limit, which defines acceptability) to fully satisfactory (in the latter case, the 
price equalling or exceeding the player’s ideal or aspiration level). Each player i is 
motivated or driven to maximize MJ(i,t), where  i∈{B,S}, that is, the measure of the 
degree of fit or membership in her judgment function incorporating her underlying values 
and goals. Elsewhere (Burns et al, 2001a), we have shown that any number of positive 
settlement results may obtain within the bargaining space, defined by the bargainers’ 
limits. Also, their beliefs (or guesses) about one another’s limits are important factors in 
their bargaining behaviour. For instance, if the buyer believes or is led to believe that the 
seller has a higher reserve price than she actually has, she might be prepared to settle at a 
price between this estimated level and her own ideal level; this settlement price would be 
higher than in the case where a more accurate seller reserve price was known to the 
buyer. A simpler pattern holds, of course, for the seller. The bargaining process entails 
then players’ communications which involve not only proposals and counter-proposals 
but adjustments of their estimates of one another’s limits as well as adjustments of their 
ambition levels or ideals in the situation (Burns et al, 2001). These adjustments depend 
on their belief revision processes, the persuasiveness and even bluffs of the players, the 
time and resource constraints under which each operates (Burns and Gomolinska, 2001). 
The possibilities are several: 
 
(1) Settlements are unambiguously reached  (provided, of course, such an outcome exists) 
      if:   pS(ideal)< p
* < pB(ideal) 
(2) No settlement or deal is reached, because the offer is unambiguously unacceptable 
      (given the particular limits of one or both players). That is, MJ(i,t) = 0 for either player: 
      p
*<pS(min) or  p
*>pB(max).  
(3) A price agreement is attainable if the proposal p
* satisfies the following conditions 
      for  buyer  as  well  as  seller:  pS(min)≤p
*<pS(ideal) and pB(ideal)<p
*≤ pB(max). 
      (Such a settlement may not be possible, but if it is, the agreement would entail a  
       substantial degree of ambiguity. A variety of prices satisfy these conditions and        
       are a function of various contingencies and conditions).  
 (4) Maximum ambiguity (maximum discontent agreement) obtains at the limits:  
      for the seller, p
*=pS(min) and for the buyer, p
*=pB(max). 
 
Remark 1: In such bargaining processes, established social relationships among the 
players involved guide adjustment processes, the construction of options and the patterns 
of interaction and outcomes (Burns and Gomolinska, 2001), as we discuss later. 
 
Remark 2: Elsewhere, we have also shown that the particular social relationship – the 
particular social rules and expectations associated with the relationship – make for greater 
or lesser deception and communicative distortion, greater or lesser transaction costs, and 
likelihood of successful bargaining (Burns et al, 1998). The difficulties – and transaction 
costs – of reaching a settlement are greatest for pure rivals. They would be more likely to 
risk missing a settlement than pragmatic “egoists.” This is because rivals tend to suppress 
the potential cooperative features of the game situation in favour of pursuing their rivalry. 
Pure “egoists” are more likely to effectively resolve some of the collective action  8 
 
dilemmas in the bargaining setting in order to achieve an optimal settlement. Friends may 
exclude bargaining altogether as a precaution against undermining their friendship 
relationship. Or, if they do choose to conduct business together, their predisposition to 
self-sacrifice for one another may also make for certain bargaining difficulties (but 
different from those of rivals) and increased transaction costs in reaching a settlement 
(Burns et al, 2001a). 
 
Remark 3: Elsewhere (Burns and Gomolinska, 2001; Burns et al, 2001), we have shown 
that bargainers may try to manipulate what the other believes about their limits. For 
instance, the sellers convinces the buyer that pS(min) is much higher than it is, 
approaching or equalling  pS(ideal). Similarly for the buyer. These processes of 
persuasion, fabrication, deception, etc. often prolong the bargaining. They may also result 
in an aborted process. 
 
The anchoring points (the players ideals and limits) in players’ value complexes   making 
up the fuzzy judgment function are relatively stable. However, players may change their 
judgment function, for instance raising or lowering their operative “ideals” in the 
situation, as we illustrate later. Working out the effects of this is more or less 
straightforward. 
 
In general, our analysis suggests a spectrum of settlement possibilities in negotiation 
games -- exactly how wide or narrow the particular space depends on the players’ 
ambition levels and limits. Also, settlements depend in part on the players beliefs or 
estimates of one another’s  anchoring points and, in part, on their social relationships 
which orient and regulate their evaluations and judgments in the game process.  
 
3. APPLICATIONS AND RESULTS 
 
Buyer and sellers operate in a negotiation space or zone NS in which they make bids and 
offers respectively. Let us denote by  p  the “settlement price of a transaction”. We 
should  assume that  p>0. Observe that a transaction obtains when S’s offer x matches  
B’s bid y, x=y. It follows that  p=x=y. The prices acceptable to both sides of the 
negotiation are on the diagonal y=x. This line is referred to as the settlement line.   
 
Our analysis entails consideration of the relationship of the players’ value complexes 
(defining 4 points, that is, two points for each player) in relation to the line of potential 
settlement in the negotiation space. There is an interval of possible, acceptable solutions 
to the players (the set may, of course, be empty; see later). 
 
The “level of satisfaction” for both negotiators is described  by M(S,B) by the following: 
M(S,B)(p)=( ) (p) M   (p), M t) J(B, t) J(S, , 
 where p∈NS. 
 
Given the players’ value complexes, we obtain thirteen (13) cases of potential 
“transaction prices” on the settlement interval which can be described  geometrically and   9 
 
by M(S,B)(p) (see representations in the figures of Appendix 1 and also Table 1). In this 
paper, given that each of the players of the bargaining game operate with an interval 
(defined by two points, an ideal or goal price and a limit price where the former is 
assumed greater than the latter), then the two intervals in relation to one another generate 
13 possible situations. The GGT models of the situations specify the potential transaction 
prices on the settlement interval. In one of the situations (SIT 1), the players’ value 
complexes are completely incompatible, and there is no settlement interval or point and, 
therefore, no transaction possibility. In two of the situations (SIT 12,13), there are 
potentially mutual and fully satisfactory situations in that their respective ideals can be 
realized in their transactions. In two other situations (SIT 2,3), there are potential 
settlements above the limits of both but below their goals or ideals and, therefore, not 
fully satisfying for either. Finally, most of the situations (SIT 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11) are 
asymmetric providing a better result (in some cases according to a player’s goal) for one 
of the players but not the other. Our analysis also shows how the social relationship of the 
players through the relationship’s inherent values and meta-values – or a more general 
normative order applying in the situation S: 
(1) orients them to or focuses them on particular zones of the settlement interval that 
most corresponds to or fits the core value(s) of their relationship;  
(2) motivates them to adapt or transform their operative goals or aspiration levels in the 
bargaining game in a manner consistent with their relationship. This is a particularly 
important process in situations where the bargaining conditions are problematic or 
judgment dilemmas arise. 
 
In our application of the theory, we consider two general types of game conditions:   
 
I. Game situations where the players’ value complexes are exogenously given and fixed 
but  the players may orient  differentially to the potential settlement interval as a function 
of their social relationship;  
 
II. Situations where the players transform their value complexes, in particular their ideal     
or aspiration levels in a given game as a function of the particular relationship or 
normative order applying to the interaction situation, that is the shift or revision of value 
orientations endogenous to the game process.  
 
Given either exogenously or endogenously determined value complexes, players generate 
potential “settlement intervals”. The latter are a function of the players’ value complexes 
vis-a-vis one another and their concrete social context (including non-market 
relationships). In the negotiation context where a social relationship is activated, each 
player i, operates with a value complex, VALUE(i,t)=(pi(ideal), pi(limit), vi, meta-vi), 
where i∈{B,S}; pi(ideal) is as defined earlier; pi(limit) is either pS(min) or pB(max); vi 
and meta-vi are characteristic of the players’ particular social relationship; so, vi is a value 
or value orientation defining right and proper actions of i and j vis-à-vis one another and 
also possibly right and proper outcomes. For instance, the core value orientation vi of 
actor i in the case of a solidary relationship with j entails taking the other’s desires and 
needs into account and preferring to share gains (and losses). In a domination relation, the 
core value vi characterizing the relationship orients the players toward asymmetry in  10 
 
actions and outcomes. The vi orientations for enemies are similar to one another in that 
the players are mutually oriented to causing distress and dis-benefit or harm to the other. 
 
The meta-value, meta-vi, in VALUE(i,t) orients the players in relation to their judgment 
situation and to making adjustments and transformations. It operates in two ways:  
 
(1) It orients players to or focuses them on the zone(s) of the settlement interval that most 
correspond to or fits the core value(s) of the relationship, for example, as articulated 
in vi. Thus, solidary negotiators are oriented to those potential prices on the settlement 
interval that correspond to or realize the value or norm of mutual benefit and gain (or 
sharing of losses), whereas participants in a relationship of domination are oriented to 
the asymmetric possibilities on the settlement interval. Such a mechanism operates 
even in the case of exogenously determined value complexes. 
(2)  It adapts or transforms value complexes in  an interaction situation St in a manner 
consistent with the relationship. For instance, it prioritizes changes in pi(ideal) 
according to the degree that the change is judged similar to or fitting vi. Thus, 
solidary  players adjust or transform pi(ideal) so that in the concrete situation it 
expresses or realizes the core value(s) of the relationship, e.g. as articulated in vi  in 
terms of mutual benefit or justice. Thus, on a general level, the meta-value meta-vi 
transforms the value complex, in particular it transforms pi(ideal) 
 
meta-vi: pi(ideal,t) → pi(ideal, t+1) 
 
This is a major mechanisms operating in the case of endogenously determined value 
complexes. 
 
The following subsections defines and analyzes the relations between players’ value 
complexes including their ideals or ambition levels, limits, and any meta-value deriving 
from their social relationship(s), the resultant negotiation situations, and likely bargaining 
results. 
 
3.1. Exogenous determination of value complexes.  
 
Exogenously determined value complexes are -- for our purposes here -- considered 
fixed. Observe that for all situations except number 1 (the empty settlement set) and 
number 13 (convergence on a point), there is an interval of settlement prices. The 
question is how do bargainers determine a final price or limit the region of satisfactory 
settlement prices. One major factor in limiting the settlement interval is the non-market 
social relation(s) of the players.  A social relationship between players implies the 
activation of particular values and meta-values that orient their judgments and 
negotiations within the configuration of their value complexes. As indicated above, the 
meta-value meta-vi(t) for player i at time or situation t is a part of an player’s operative 
value complex in the situation. It orients the players to a particular region or regions of 
the settlement interval where the latter is defined by their exogenously determined ideals 
and limits in their respective value complexes. Through such mechanisms, considerations 
other than pure market oriented calculation may be activated and influence negotiation  11 
 
judgments and outcomes. For instance, the players see one another as members of a 
solidary group (family, friendship network, etc.) or as participants in a status or authority 
relationship; or as rivals or enemies. Evaluative judgments based on these diverse social 
relationships lead them to react in differentiated but predictable ways to the 13 situations, 
as we argue below. 
 
For instance, a dominated player in a status or authority relationship would focus on an 
appropriate part of the interval – defined by the meta-value orienting the player to those 
potential prices which give priority to asymmetric levels of satisfaction or realization: in 
other words, the satisfaction or realization of the dominant player’s ideal should be 
greater than that for the dominated player. The more or less shared value complex of 
solidary players would orient them to finding mutually satisfying settlements. Players 
who are indifferent to one another (for instance, self-interested rationalists) would act 
pragmatically, accepting a settlement or settlements as long as it (they) do not violate 
their limits. 
  
There are four types of general patterns discernible in the thirteen (13) distinct situations 
(see appendix).  
 
 (1) The settlement zone is non-empty and is characterized by ideal results for both 
        bargaining agents.  
This type of occurrence is found in situations 12 and 13 where the negotiators’ ideals 
converge. The convergence is a point in one case (situation 13), extending to a line in the 
other (situation 12). The meta-value(s) of the players having a solidary relationship would 
predispose them to focus on their mutually satisfactory zone of the settlement interval. 
The upper zone in figure 12 would be particularly satisfying to such players.  On the 
other hand, rivals or enemies are predisposed to reject the opportunities for such 
satisfactory solutions, although their evaluations in fact were initially convergent. That is, 
they would be predisposed to orient away from  the region of mutual benefit and 
satisfaction. In general, neither mutual gain nor asymmetrical outcomes are satisfactory 
to players who are rivals or in a hostile social relationship. Their value orientations 
drive them rather to divergence than to convergence, thus drawing out the 
negotiations in time and increasing the likelihood  of a breakdown, even causing 
them to miss or give up opportunities to make certain (mutual) gains with which, in 
other circumstances, they would be very pleased. In the case of negotiators involved in 
a status or authority relationship, they would be predisposed to focus on the zone of the 
settlement characterized by the highest degree of asymmetry, favouring of course the 
satisfaction of the dominant player more than that of the dominated player but within the 
limit defined by the subordinate player’s value complex. On the other hand, self-
interested players lack by definition social passions, for instance, a deep concern for the 
other player characteristic of solidary relations, or the competitiveness of rivals or the 
animosity of enemies. Rational actors would of course bargain to obtain the best possible 
deal for self but would be prepared to accept any of the settlements near to or on the ideal 
settlement zone.  
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(2) The settlement interval contains ideal solutions but asymmetrically. 
Situations 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 and 11 are characterized by asymmetry, where 4 and 7 provide 
ideal settlements only for the buyer, 5 and 6 only for the seller, and where 8,9,10, and 11 
provide ideal settlements for both but not in common. In such situations, players with a 
status or authority relationship are predisposed to focus on the substantial zone of the 
settlement interval characterized by asymmetry, favouring the satisfaction of the 
dominant player more than that of the dominated player. Solidary players would try 
unsuccessfully to identify a zone of prices or price which represents a “fair deal” or as 
much gain for both as possible, thus minimizing asymmetric possibilities. Rational, self-
interested players would bargain to obtain the best possible deal for self  but would settle 
even for an asymmetric result, provided it does not violate their limits. A hostile player or 
rival would accept inferior settlement prices that also disadvantage the other, for instance 
any of the asymmetric outcomes disfavoring the other. In general, rivals would each 
reject asymmetric settlements  and, thus, abort the  game. Of course, if the player who 
gains more satisfaction can conceal this from the other, then a settlement might be 
reached. But rivals as well as enemies typically gain satisfaction from pointing out an 
asymmetric result which disadvantages the other.  
 
(3) The settlement interval is not empty but it contains no ideal solutions for either 
      of the players.  
This is characterized by situations 2 and 3. Neither player can fully realize her ideal but 
the interval of possible solutions is within their respective limits (maximum price for the 
buyer and minimum price for the seller). Solidary players might either try to sacrifice for 
one another, or to find a “fair division,” according to some norm or principle of 
distributive justice appropriate for their relationship. In the case of players in a status  or 
authority relationship, Situation 2 offers no satisfactory pattern, either in terms of the 
dominant player’s ideal settlement or in terms of realizing or satisfying the meta-value of 
asymmetry which defines in part their relationship. Situation 3 offers partial satisfaction 
to the dominant player.  
 
(4) The settlement interval or zone is empty.  
The maximum of the buyer is less than the minimum of the seller (SIT 1). This is 
characterized by situation 1 where the rectangle of lines defined by their respective value 
complexes do not intersect with the settlement line. Given exogenously determined, fixed 
value complexes, situation 1 offer no openings for settlement, regardless of the social 
relationship between the players (an exception to this rule is discussed below). On the one 
hand, the no settlement situation is fully expected or “natural“  for a relationship of 
animosity, where both players are oriented to mutual non-cooperation (–C–C).  On the 
other hand, this situation clashes with the value orientations which characterize a solidary 
relation (CC)  or  those  which  characterize  players  in  a  status or authority relationship  
(C–C or –CC). In these cases,  the players would be predisposed to adjust their goals or 
ideal levels, for instance, the subordinate player would sacrifice by lowering her goal and 
accepting a worse settlement vis-a-vis the higher status person or authority. This type of 
adjustment is analyzed in section 3.2 dealing with endogenous formation of value 
complexes.  
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This sub-section has considered the role of established relationships, external to the 
market relation, in limiting or determining the price on a given interval. There are several 
other possible factors or mechanisms in determining a final price or a more narrow range 
of settlement prices, for instance:  
•  Players choose the final price in the middle between two acceptable prices. 
•  They choose the final price in the optimal interval proportional to the “level of 
satisfaction” of both players in the negotiation. 
•  They ask a mediator (or arbiter) to assist in determining a fair procedure and/or fair 
price (range), or they themselves apply an agreed upon fair division procedure. 
•  The fuzzy judgment process could be repeated on another level, meaning that both 
sides agree on the interval prices, and then they construct their fuzzy judgment 
function once again but  in such a way that (pS(min), pS(ideal)), (pB(ideal), pB(max)) 
defines an “interval of optimal prices”, and then they repeat the procedure. 
•  They apply other procedures on which both parties agree before initiating negotiation. 
 
Consideration of these extensions of the theory would take us beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
3.2 Endogenous Determination of Value Complexes 
 
In the case of endogenous processes, players adjust their operative ideal or aspiration 
level as a function of their social relationship or the normative context in which they 
interact.  Normally, they maintain stability in their value complexes, because these play a 
key role in orienting and guiding them in their judgments and actions and in giving them 
identity. Established value complexes enable them to be predictable and trustworthy. But 
if, in a given situation, no satisfactory deal obtains in the settlement interval, they are 
motivated to reconsider and possibly restructure their value complexes -  at least for 
operative purposes. This is done as a function of the meta- value meta-vi,(t) defined by 
their social relationship (where i∈(B,S) and t is time or context). That is, the value sub-
complex defined by their particular social relationship and  activated in the situation 
operates on the players’ value complexes: 
 
meta-vi: VALUE(i,t) →VALUE(i,t+1)    
 
where i∈{B,S}  and VALUE(i,t)=(pi(ideal, t), pi(limit, t), vi(t), meta-vi(t)). 
 
In sum, value sub-complexes derived from non-market social relationships may be 
activated and influence players’ operative value complexes and, therefore, their   
judgments and, ultimately, market negotiation outcomes. In this subsection, we are 
interested in the transformation of value complexes, in particular players’ ideals or 
aspiration levels in the given negotiation situation. The following analyses consider 
different types of social relationship and their impact on players’ adjustments and 
revisions of their operative ideals or goals in the situation.  
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(1) Solidary relationships and mutual adjustment to construct common ideal levels. 
Solidary players are predisposed to adjust their “ideal levels” to take one another into 
account. Genuine mutual cooperativeness (CC) is valued in the relationship and is likely 
to be generated in a wide range of situations (although there are limits, defining the scope 
or field of the relationship (Burns et al, 2001). In a bargaining process, they are disposed 
to adjust their ideal levels closer to one another’s limits, whether minimum or maximum 
levels, as the case may be. Thus, they tend to  generate overlapping areas such as in 
situations 12 and 13. The players are thus likely to find a price or prices which satisfy 
both of them. One interpretation of this is that each would like to obtain a result that no 
one of them would experience as a decrease in “level of satisfaction” at the same time the 
other gains in “level of satisfaction” (similar to Pareto optimal solution).  
 
In general, given a bargaining situation in the context of a solidary relation, the players 
would be predisposed to mutually adjust their aspiration levels so that they converge or 
overlap.  Such convergence already obtains  in situations 12 and 13. In these situations, 
their ambition levels are fully compatible: 
 
pS(ideal) < pB(ideal). 
 
Both realize their ideals in situation 12: p∈(pS(ideal), pB(ideal))  
 
and in situation 13, p=pS(ideal)=pB(ideal). 
 
The situations 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 entail partial incompatibility or contradiction. In these 
cases, solidary players are motivated to adjust their operative ideals, reducing them so as 
to bring about convergence between the ideal levels (that is, departing substantially from 
their initial buyer and seller positions). Thus, buyer moves her ideal toward pB(max) and 
seller moves hers toward pS(min), thereby approaching the case of situation 13. They may 
even sacrifice vis-à-vis one another to such an extent that  pS(ideal) <pB(ideal), generating 
the pattern of situation 12. 
 
Formally, they may transform their individual ideals into a mutual or collective ideal: 
 
pS(ideal), pB(ideal) → pBS(ideal). 
 
They apply this collective ideal in their deliberations on and determinations of the 
settlement price. And they find partial realizations, that is “solutions,” with respect to 
their shared or collective ideal, pBS(ideal). This is accomplished within their respective 
limits, pS(min) and  pB(max), for instance in the determination of a price that is judged to 
be “a fair deal for both.”  
 
In situation 1, there is an obvious contradiction. If their respective limits are fixed, then 
there will be no settlement, even given their solidary relationship. Again, they would be 
predisposed to revise their limits in order to find or create a common zone. Further 
considerations of such matters would take us beyond the analyses presented in this paper. 
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 (2)  Domination relationships and asymmetrical adjustment of value complexes 
        (ideals).  
Players having a particular status or authority relationship are predisposed in the 
bargaining game to adjust their ideal levels as follows: 
Dominant player: Either she makes no adjustment or she raises her operative ideal in the 
situation. 
Dominated player: She adjusts her ideal level downward to fit the dominant player’s 
expectations or demands (at least up to her own limit).  This is a –CC (or, alternatively a 
C–C) situation, that is, one player “cooperates” by making a sacrifice and accepting a less 
satisfactory settlement. The dominant player does not cooperate in this way but maintains 
or increases her ideal (exceptions arise in contexts where norms of nobless oblige apply 
to the dominant player). 
 
In the case that the players have no established status or authority relationship, but have 
unequal power (because of differential knowledge or capabilities, or because one has 
alternative possibilities and the other does not), they are inclined to asymmetrically 
adjust their operative aspiration levels (and possibly their limits).  Thus, a dominated 
buyer adjusts her operative goal or aspiration level in the situation to accommodate the 
demand or expectation of the dominant seller:  
 
meta-vB : pB(ideal,t) → pB(ideal, t+1)≈ pS(ideal). 
 
The settlement price would satisfy the seller more (relative to her initial ideal or 
aspiration price) that that of the buyer. The same mechanism would operate in the case of 
a powerful, assertive buyer vis-a-vis a weak seller who is compelled to accommodate. 
The situation can be seen as involving a parallel mechanism to that described above in the 
case of a status or authority relationship.  
 
In Situation 1, if the dominated player’s limit is fixed, then there will be no resolution, 
she would refuse to transact. But, of course, under some conditions, she might be 
prepared to adjust her limit (in self-sacrifice) in order to make possible a transaction, 
satisfying the demands or expectations of the dominant agent. Such considerations would 
take us beyond the analyses of this paper.  
 
In other situations, the dominated player negotiates within her initial limit and provides 
self-sacrificing solutions which realize or approach realizing the ideal of the dominant 
player. For instance, in the case of a dominant seller, the buyer accedes to her, 
 
p ≈ pB(max). 
 
Or, alternatively for a dominant buyer, the seller accedes, 
 
p ≈ pS(min). 
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In the case that the dominated player also adjusts her operative ideal to be closer to her 
limit  (and closer to the ideal of the dominant player), then in the limit:
9 
Dominant seller:  p ≈ pB(max) ≈ pB(ideal) ≤ pS(ideal). 
Dominant buyer: p ≈ pS(min) ≈  pS(ideal) ≤ pB(ideal). 
 
(3) Relationships of rivalry or hostility and disruptive adjustment of value     
       complexes.  
If the players in  the situation are hostile to one another (–C–C) – or are rivals – they 
would be mutually predisposed  to increase their ideal or aspiration levels vis-a-vis one 
another. Each would be oriented to cause distress in the other. The seller would set her 
pS(ideal) as high as possible, possibly above pB(max), and the buyer would set pB(ideal) 
as low as possible, even below pS(min). This might result in Situation 1, or at least in 
Situations 2 or 3 with a much narrowed settlement interval than otherwise would be the 
case, for instance if they were purely rational actors. 
 
Hostile players would also be predisposed to set their limits close to their ideal or 
aspiration levels. That is, the seller would tend to increase pS(min), and the buyer to 
decrease pB(max), thus, reducing the potential settlement interval. This can be interpreted 
as a judgment to refuse to make any sacrifice or suffer any burden whatsoever for the 
sake of the other or for reaching a common settlement. Under such conditions of 
antagonism, negotiation would tend to break down entirely. There are limits to these 
tendencies, having to do with, among other things, the degree of relative importance for 
the players of making a transaction with one another (that is, the opportunity costs of 
aborted transactions).  
 
(4) Indifference without adjustment. 
If the players in the situation are purely self-interested – without concern or passion –  
that is, neither has responsibility for or claims on the other (a type of anomie), then they 
tend to act pragmatically. They are prepared to accept a settlement which is above their 
minimum (or alternatively maximum) level. In this sense, they cooperate in the 
adjustment process. 
 
Thus, given an anomic relationship among self-interested players, they are predisposed to 
try to get the best for self but also are prepared to compromise in order to obtain a 
settlement, at least within the space defined by their limits and their ideals.  They would 
settle in the manner analyzed earlier in terms of exogenously fixed value complexes (with 
given ideals and limits). This pattern arises because the players have no compelling 
social relationship and related value structures inducing or obligating them to alter 
their value complexes. 
 
Table 1 summarises the relationships between type of situation, character of the social 
relationship, and transaction patterns.  
 
                                                            
9 Such adjustments reduce the experience of dissonance between the dominated player’s aspiration level 
and her actual exchange conditions (Burns and Gomolinska, 2000). 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS  
 
(1) As indicated earlier, one future development would be to consider the judgment 
processes and procedures which players use in determining a transaction price within  a 
settlement interval or zone. 
 
(2) A further consideration is to define and analyze the transformation of value 
complexes, in particular their limits (that is, maxima or minima). 
 
(3) Processes of persuasion and deception can be modelled and analyzed in that the 
players operate with models of the situation which are constructions with incomplete and 
imperfect information (possibly, false information) (Burns and Gomolinska, 2001). 
 
(4) The bargaining process can be analysed further in terms of players’ styles of 
negotiation (for instance, cooperative or competitive negotiation styles). Such styles of 
negotiations do not always correspond fully to their social relationships. The use of a 
particular style may depends on the specific issue of negotiation, the context of the 
situation, personality factors, and so on. Thus, solidary players may find themselves  in a 
negotiation situation where non-cooperative styles are expected or appropriate. Or, 
conversely, rivals or enemies may find themselves dealing with an issue or interacting in 
a situation where more cooperative styles are expected by key outside agents or by 
general norms and laws applying to the situation. In a bargaining situation where both 
negotiators use competitive styles and aim to outdo the other, the likelihood of agreement 
would be small except in situation 2 (price p=pB(max)=pS(min)) and situation 13 price 
p=pB(ideal)=pS(ideal), where equality of outcomes obtain. Similarly, they may also 
negotiate and arrive at a settlement in situation 12 (where “equality” in terms of each 
realizing her ideal obtains in the settlement interval). In the other situations, no agreement 
would be acceptable to both, since the outcomes are asymmetric.   
 
When one of the negotiators consistently uses the competitive style, and the other a 
cooperative  one, agreement would tend to be at the limits, namely price p=pB(max) or 
p=pS(min). When both negotiators follow cooperative styles, the interval of acceptable 
prices arises – as characterized in this paper in a number of our cases -- and the question 
remains of determining the final settlement price. 
 
(5) Finally, the model of fuzzy membership function has a very simple form in this paper 
-- only four levels of satisfaction: full, partially, minimum, and unsatisfactory. One may 
readily extend the analysis to consider functions with more levels of satisfaction,  on one 
side, or with more complicated analytical forms, on the other side. Thus, in a certain 
sense, the model presented here is a starting point to analyze bargaining situations, where 
membership functions have many levels of satisfaction or take on more complex forms.   18 
 
Table 1. Relationships between Type of Situation, Character of the Social Relationship, and                 
                Transaction patterns.  
 
  CC (Solidary 
Relation)      
-CC/C-C (Domination 
Relationship) 










SIT 12, 13 
Price determination and 
transaction take place 
within the configuration of 
the players’ value 
complexes. No change 
expected in value 
complexes 
The dominated player 
adjusts her value complex, 
generating one of the 
asymmetric situations, SIT 
8, 9, or 10. Price 
determination and 
transaction takes place 




generating  SITs 1,2, 
or 3 with a  narrowed 
(or in SIT 1 no) 
settlement interval. 
Any price negotiation 
and transactions takes 
place within the 
configuration of 
value complexes 














result for one 
of the 
players than 
the other:  
SIT 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 11 
The players adjust  their 
value complexes to 
construct a collective or 
common ideal. And they 
determine a price which is 
as close to equally 
satisfying for both as 
possible.  
Price determination and 
transaction within the 
configuration of value 
complexes. The 
dominated player operates 
in the region of the 
settlement interval that 
generates appropriate 
asymmetric  outcome,  
consistent with the 
relationship but within her 
limit. There is no tendency 
on the players’ part to 
transform their value 
complexes
10 
Low likelihood of a 
settlement. 
Transaction possible 
if the player who 
gains more 
satisfaction manages 
to conceal this from 





















2,  3 
Transaction. The players 
adjust their value 
complexes in order to 
construct a collective or 
common ideal. And then 
determine a price for both 
which is equally 
satisfying.   
The dominated player 
operates with the region of 
the settlement interval that 
generates appropriate 
asymmetric  outcome, that 
is  consistent with the 
relationship. But SIT 2 is 
highly problematic since 
there is no asymmetry. 
This is alien to players in a 
genuine relation of 
domination. And SIT 3 is 
problematic for either a 
dominant buyer or a 
dominant seller. 
Low likelihood of a 
settlement. But 
transaction possible 
within the limits. But 
rivals typically gain 
satisfaction from 
revealing the 









No transaction, in the 
preliminary assessment. 
However, the players are 
predisposed to adjust 
limits in their value 
complexes, so as to 
construct situations such 
as SITs 2,3 6, 7, or 11 
No transaction. However, 
the  dominated player is 
predisposed (and 
expected) to adjust her 
limit resulting in situations 
such as SITs 4,5,6,7 
No transaction and 
no tendency to adjust 
limits of their value 
complexes. SIT 1 fits 
– is a “natural” 









                                                            
10 SIT,4,5 6,7 are problematic for one or the other player (as SITs 2 and 3 are not fully satisfactory). For 
instance SIT 4 and 6 are problematic for a dominant seller, and SIT 5 and SIT 7 are problematic for a 
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B - Buyer 
S - Seller 
pB(ideal) - ideal price for the Buyer 
pB(max) - maximal  price for the Buyer 
pS(min) - minimal  price for the Seller  
pS(ideal) - ideal price for the Seller 
NS – bargaining space  






        S  
  B  
 
                  pB(ideal)      pB(max)             pS(min)      pS(ideal) 
 






























              Figure 1. 
            
          B 
        
      No transaction                    
    
                                                
 
                      
 
 
pB(max)                    
pB(ideal)         
             
            







        S  
 B 
 
                      pB(ideal)   pS(min)= pB(max)           pS(ideal) 
 























M(S,B)(p) = () (max) p (min) p p     if        0.5    0.5; B S = =   
        
   Figure 2. 
           
         B 
          
 
pB(max)                               
                                                                                               
               no ideal solution               
               either for Seller or 
pB(ideal)             for Buyer 
                              
  
 
           
          0                       pS(min)      pS(ideal)                            S 





pB(ideal)< pS(min)<pB(max)< pS(ideal) 
 
 
        S  
  B  
 







































   (min) p p    if           d   0.5;
(max)) p   (min), (p p     if              d c;





        
   Figure 3. 
   
        B                               
  
                                        
                              no ideal solution    
pB(max)        either  for  Seller   
                    or for Buyer   
    
 
pB( i d e a l )            
                              
          
           
         0            pS(min)              pS(ideal)                          S 








        S  
 B 
 












































(min) p p     if           1   0.5;
] (ideal) p (min), (p p     if               1   c;
  (max)) p   (ideal), (p p     if              d c;






        
   Figure 4. 
 
    B       
 
  
  pB(max)                        
         
        
 
  pB(ideal)                         ideal solution           
                                     only for Buyer  
 
              
 
            0     pS(min)                                     pS(ideal)                        S 






pB(ideal)<pS(min)< pS(ideal) < pB(max)  
 
 
        S  
 B 
 











































(min) p p     if           d   0.5;
) (ideal) p (min), p ( p     if               d   c;
  (max)) p   (ideal), p [ p     if               d 1;






        
   Figure 5. 
    
          B       
 
 
pB(max)    
               ideal solution  
              only for Seller 
                                   
  
 
pB(ideal)         
 
    0     pS(min)  pS(ideal)                                         S 





pB(ideal)< pS(min)< pS(ideal)=pB(max) 
 
        S  
  B  
 
                    pB(ideal)       pS(min)          pS(ideal)= pB(max) 
 








































  (min) p p     if            d   0.5;
(ideal)) p (min), (p p     if                d c;





    Figure 6.    
    
          B 
         
          
                 ideal solution  
 
pB(max)               only for Seller 
                             
                                            
                                                                                                       
 
pB(ideal) 
         
            
             








        S 
  B 
 
          pS(min)=pB(ideal)                         pB(max)      pS(ideal) 
 








   
 
 



























  (ideal) p   (min) p p     if         1   0.5;
(max)) p   (ideal), (p (max)) p (min), (p p     if           d c;
(max) p p     if        0.5 c;
B S
B B B S
B
 
   Figure 7.     
    





pB( m a x )           
 
            ideal solution          
pB(ideal)          only for Buyer        
                                       
  
         
            
            
        0          pS(min)                      pS(ideal)                            S 








        S  
 B 
 















































(min) p p     if         1   0.5;
] (ideal) p (min), (p p     if            1   c;
  (ideal)) p   (ideal), (p p     if           d c;
(max)) p   (ideal), p [ p     if           d 1;







        
   Figure 8. 
          B 
    
          
 
pB(max)     ideal  solution 
     o n l y   f o r   S e l l e r    
                                                               
 
pB(ideal)          ideal solution                             
                   only for Buyer                      
                          
 
          
            
           0    pS(min)       pS(ideal)                                                    S 







pS(min)<pB(ideal)< pS(ideal) =pB(max) 
 
        S  
 B 
 
                  pS(min)             pB(ideal)                pS(ideal)=pB(max)  
 











































         (min) p p     if           1   0.5;
] (ideal) p (min), (p p     if               1   c;
(ideal)) p    (ideal), (p p     if              d c;





  Figure 9. 
           
   B    
          
 
  
pB(max)      ideal  solution 
      o n l y   f o r   S e l l e r  
 
pB(ideal)              ideal solution  
                         only for Buyer   
        
  
              
 
            0     pS(min)          pS(ideal)                                  S 




pS(min)=pB(ideal)< pS(ideal) < pB(max) 
 
        S  
 B 
 
               pS(min)=pB(ideal)                pS(ideal)         pB(max)  
 









































(ideal) p (min) p p     if               1   0.5;
(ideal)) p   (ideal), (p (ideal)) p (min), (p p     if                 d c;
(max)) p   (ideal), p [ p     if                 d 1;
(max) p p     if              0.5 1;
B S




        
   Figure 10. 
           
          B       
   
 
 
pB(max)      ideal  solution 
                     only for Seller  
 
pB(ideal)                                       ideal solution                  
                                                only for Buyer                      
          
                          
           
           0        pS(min)     pS(ideal)                                           S 









        S  
  B  
 
                            pS(min)=pB(ideal)          pS(ideal)=pB(max) 
 







































(ideal) p (min) p p     if        1 0.5;
(max)) p   , (ideal) p ( (ideal)) p    (min), p ( p     if          d c;
(max) p (ideal) p p     if       0.5 1;
B S
B B S S
B S
 
        
   Figure 11. 
           B 
                    
     
    pB(max)            ideal  solution   
                     only for Seller 
       
      i d e a l   s o l u t i o n  
      o n l y   f o r   B u y e r    
   pB(ideal)                                         
                                           
                                            
                
             0          pS(min)              pS(ideal)                              S 




pS(min)<pS(ideal)< pB(ideal) < pB(max) 
 
 
        S  
 B 
 














































(min) p p     if         1    0.5;
) (ideal) p (min), (p p     if            1   c;
  ] (ideal) p (ideal), p [ p     if            1   1;
(max)) p   (ideal), p ( p     if           d   1;







   Figure 12.    
    
          B    
 
pB(max)    
 
pB(ideal)           ideal solution 
                       for both   
                    Seller and Buyer             
                                                    
                                                      
                 
 
 










        S  
 B 
 
                  pS(min)      pB(ideal) = pS(ideal)               pB(max)  
 











































(min) p p     if         1   0.5;
) (ideal) p (min), (p ) (ideal) p (min), (p p     if            1   c;
(ideal) p (ideal) p p     if            1 1;
(max)) p   (ideal), p ( (max)) p   (ideal), p ( p     if           d 1;
(max) p p     if        0.5 1;
S
B S S S
B S







 Figure 13.    
 
         B     
  
pB(max)            
 
      
                          ideal solution 
pB(ideal)             for both   
                                         Seller and Buyer 
                                                  
                                                                                  
             
               
  
             0   pS(min)     pS(ideal)                                                   S 